gōbišn abar gōbāgīh | A treatise on logic (Paul the Persian)-(GG)

pārsīg

gōbišn abar gōbāgīh

ō Husrav ī šāhān šāh mardān pahlum Paul bannag-it drūd!

I

§ frazānagīh ī ast dānišn ī rāst ī harvisp, andar ašmāh ast, ud az frazānagīh ī andar ašmāh pārag-ē ašmāh rāy frēstem. ud nē abd sahed. cē az xvad pālēz ī-tān xvadāyīh pārag ō ašmāh frāz barem, [ēdōn cōn] az dāmān ī yazd ō yazd yazišn frāz yazem. bē pārag ī an frēstem ped soxan ast. cē frazānagīh ped soxan pēdāgīhed, hān-z ī veh az abārīg harv pārag. anīz ēd az frazānagīh abar frazānagīh guft ēsted kū: «hān ī man bar veh az zarr abēzag, ud hān ī man bun veh az asēm vizīdag.» ēnak: drustīh ud zōr ud tuvānīgīh ud xvadāyīh ud pādixšāyīh ud šahriyārīh ud āštīh ud dād ud ēvēn, ud ō hangirdīg handāzem, harv kunišn ī nēk.

gētīg-iz ped xrad kird ud pahrist ēsted, ōn cōn cašm ī gyān, ī kōr, ē parzūd az vēnāgīh ī hāmōyēn xīrān, pediš ēvāz rōšnīhed ud frōgīhed, ā-z veh az bēvar bēvar cašm ī tan. cē ēn cašm ēvāz rāstīh ī andar visp vēned, pedisāy nazdīh ī-š ast ō rāstīh ī ped visp. cē ēdōn cōn cašm ī tan pedisā-š hamcihragīh abāg rōšnīh ī bērōn vēned, ham ēdōn-z cašm ī gyān, pedisā-š nazdīh ō rōšnīh ī dānišnīg ī andar visp, rōšnīh ī andar visp vēned. ud ham cōn ōy kē-š cašm ī tan ō rōšnīh ī sōhišnīg rōn nizārīhed, ēc nē ayāb kam vēned, hamgōnag-iz ōy kē-š cašm ī gyān ped rōšnīh dānišnīg nē frahaxted, ēc nē ayāb kam vēned. ā nēk hān ī az frazānag-ē guft būd ēsted: «dānāg cašm pediš sar, ud dušāgāh andar tārīkīh raved.» virēg ī az ēn tārīkīh ī zyāngar ud vēnišn ī rōšnīh ī sūdegar rāy vasān pēšēnagān xvēš gyān abespārd; cē-šān vindād kū az abārīg harv [kār ud] pahrēz, [kār ud] pahrēz ī gyānīg abēr vehdar, cim mardōm az gyān ud tan hamēnīd ēsted, bē gyān az tan and vehdar cand gōbāg az agōbāg ud zīvāg az azīvāg.

mardōm-iz gyān vasnād ast zīvāg ī gōbāg. bē pahrēz ud peyrāyag ī gyān ast dānišn, ud az dānišn baved. ud dānišn ayāb mardōm abāyed ud ayābed, ayāb ped hamōzišn handōzed. bē hamōzišn aziš rāst az mardōm ō mardōm abāz abespārd ēsted, ud aziš kasān ped aštagīh cōn ka az dānišnīgān (ušīgān) gōbend. bē ōn jast kū ēk ō did pedīrag ud hamēstārīg. cē az avēšān anī gōbed kū «yazd ēk», bē anī «yazd ēvāz nē ēk»; anī gōbed kū «ōy rāy hambidīg ast», ud anī «u-š ēc hambidīg nēst»; anī gōbed kū «ped harv tis tuvānīg», bē anī «nē visptuvān šāyed būdan»; anī gōbed kū «gētīg u-š harv cē andarš ōy ast dādār», bē anī «ōy dādār ī harv tis nē sazed būdan»; ud ast kē gōbend kū «az nē-tis kird gētīg», ud ast kē gōbend kū «-š az māyag kird»; ud ast kē «abun ast gētīg» gōbend «ud afrazām pettāyišnīg-iz», ud anī ped juttar dārend; ud ast kē gōbend kū «mardōmān hend āzād ped kām», ud ast kē-š hamēstār baved; ahanūn-z abārīg vas ped im šōn gōbend, ud ped xvēš kirdag (cāštag) nihend, ī ka andar-šān nigerem ēk ō did hamēstār ud pedyārag. ēd rāy cē pedīriftan ud vurravistan ī hāmōyēn kēšān (hamōgān) ped xvār nē dārem ud nē šāyem, mā agar ēk gīrem ud abārīg hilem, ayāb ēk vizinem ud abārīg ānābem. ēd rāy abāyed āškārag-dānišnīh ī pedisāš abārīg bē hištan ud ped ēk bē vurravistan. bē agar āškārag-pēdāgīh ī ēn nēst, ēg xīr ī avīn kēšān ō vurravišn ud dānišn rōn abāyistan.

hō vasnād cē dānišn abzār ud nēkīh ī gētīg ud āsānīh ī gyānān (ruvānān) ud šādīh ī dānišnīgān (ušīgān) kuned, vurravišn-z hān vēš frāz stāyem kē ēn hamāg pediš abērdar vindād bavend, ud hān kē-š [ēv] az ēn [hamāg] apēdag, ud hambasān abēvimand-gōbišn, tar menem u-š ped xvār dārem, u-š ped avvēnišn pedīz ravem.

hō vasnād cē dānišn az vēnišn ud peymasišn ī ped harvtis bavandag baved, hān ī peymasišn xvad dānāgīh, ud peymasāgān dānāg nāmīhend. andar dānāgīh abērdar tis dīd, ōn cōn nišān-ē ī ō kamāndār rōn nihād ēsted ud ōy aviš cašm dōzed.

§ ud harvisp dānišnīg ayāb mārišnīg; ud gōhr gōhrumand ayāb andar-gōhr. hō vasnād cē frazānagān dānišn ī harv-tis abāyend dānistan ō vimand ī frazānagīh ēd ī «ped hān ī ast» xūb abzūd ēsted. cē kē mardōm ayāb asp ayāb anī tis kāmed dānistan kū cē ast ēk ēk az avēšān, abar ēn nē vizōyed kū mardōm ayāb asp ped gētīg cand būd hend ayāb bavend ayāb hend –cē ēn a-sāg, abāg-iz-ē kū nē cihr rāy, bē amāh rāy, ud tis-ē ī asāg amāh rāy nē dānišnīg –, bē mardōmīh [vizōyed] ī ast astīh ī mardōm, cē ped mardōmīh harv mardōm hasār. dānišn-z ped hasārīh, ud nē ped asāgīh. hamgōnag-iz abārīg. ēg frazānagīh dānišn ī vizurd ī abar harv mārišnīg ud dānišnīg, ud abar gōhr ud gōhrumand ud andargōhr.

§ anāy frazānagīh ast kirrōgīh ī harvisp kirrōgīh, ud dānāgīh ī harvisp dānāgīh, cē abzār ī hamāg kirrōgīhān ayāb dānāgīhān frazānagīh rāyēned, u-šān kunišn-z pedisāy frazānagīh frāy ud vēš abāyend. xvad dibīrīh ud soxanrāyēnāgīh ud anī dānišnān, ud ēkīh ī daxšagān, ud pesāzišn ī nāmān ud vāxšān, az frazānagīh vindīhend. ud abārīg-iz kirrōgīh acārīhā az ēdar bun gīrend, agar nāvāzīh ud agar abārīg anī kirrōgīh. bē frazānagīh ēvāz hān ī xvēš abzār sāxt ēsted, ud ō anī kirrōgīh niyāz-iš nē baved, u-š kunišn-z frāy ud vēš abāyend. ah sazāgīhā guft ēsted kū «frazānagīh kirrōgīh ī harvisp kirrōgīh, ud dānāgīh ī harvisp dānāgīh.»

§ anāy frazānagīh ast yazd-humānāgīh, cand mardōm šāyed mānistan. cē yazd dāned ud kuned, frazānag-iz yazd humānāg dāned ud varzed, bēz abēr xvazārak.

§ ēd ī cē, cōn-um azabar guft, dānišn ped do ēvēnag baved, acār frazānagīh ō do bahr baxt ēsted: anī, dīd xvānīhed; ud anī, kird.

dīd, aziš abar dānišnīgīh, ud aziš abar mārišnīgīh, ud aziš abar hān ī pešān meyān –hān-z ī xvānīhed hamōzagān.

hān ī abar dānišnīgīh ōn cōn dānišn ī abar ruvānān ud dēvān ud frēstagān, ud fragān ī gētīg –hān ī māyag xvānīhed –, ud hangirdīg, abar [hāmōyēn] cihrān avēnišnīg.

ud hān ī abar cihrīgān ōn cōn dānišn ī abar harv hān ī ped bavišn ud vināhišn, ud ped nihang gōbišn, abar hāmōyēn cihrān mārišnīg.

ud hān-z ī abar hamōzagān ī ast meyān ī mārišnīgān ud dānišnīgān, baxšīhed ō cahār ēvēnag:fradum, ušmār; ud didīgar, handāzag (zamīgpeymānīh); ud sidīgar, huniyāgīh; ud tasum, axtarmārīh.

§ hān-z ī anī bahr ī frazānagīh ī xvānīhed kird, aziš abar rāyēnīdārīh amaragānīg ōn cōn šahriyārīh ud šahragānīh, ud aziš abar rāyēnīdārīh ēvāzīg ōn cōn rāyēnīdārīh ī kadag ī kas, ud aziš abar hān ī ēvtāg, ōn cōn ēd ī kas xvēš tan sazāgīhā rāyēned.

§ do bahr ī frazānagīh ped rāh ī abzār dānīhend, ud abzār ī frazānagīh ast gōbāgīh, hān ī, cōn-um guft, frazānagīh kuned, ud nē baved bahrag-iš az gyāg-ē ō anī gyāg.

English

A Treatise on Aristotle’s Logic

Again, a treatise composed by Paul the Persian on the Logic-book of Aristotle the philosopher for the king Husrō (Chosroes).

Greetings to the fortunate Husrō, the king of kings, the best of men, Paul, your servant!

<I. Introduction to philosophy>

§ Philosophy, which is the true science of all [things], is in you; and of the philosophy that is in you I send you offerings. This is not a marvel, and even from the garden of your dominion offerings are offered to you, [as] from the created beings of God sacrifices are made to God. The offering that I send is through words. For philosophy, which is better than all other offerings, is revealed by means of words. And indeed this is what has been said by philosophy about philosophy, that is: “My fruits are better than fine gold, and my produce, than choice silver.” Behold, then, health, strength, power, and lordship, [royal] authority, kingship, and peace, and judgments and laws, and to speak briefly, all [kinds of] good deeds.

Moreover, the world is made and guided by wisdom (philosophy), as the eye of the soul which, although blind, namely deprived of the faculty to see all things, only through this [wisdom] becomes enlightened and illuminated, which is then better than a myriad myriads of eyes of the flesh. For it is only with the eye [of the soul] that one sees the truth in everything, by reason of its affinity with the truth in everything. For just as the eye of the body, on account of its community of nature with the outside light, sees, the eye of the soul also, by reason of its affinity with the spiritual light which is in everything, sees the light which is inside all [the things of the world]. And just as that one whose eyes of the body, against the sensible light, weaken, sees nothing or little, in like manner also, the one whose eyes of the soul are not instructed by the spiritual light, sees nothing or little. It is then right what is said by one of the philosophers, that: “The wise has eyes in his head, but the fool walks in darkness.” To escape from this bad (disadvantageous) darkness and to see the good (useful) light, many of the ancients delivered their life to the eternity (eternal world), for they found out that the care of the soul is much better than all other cares, on account of the fact that man is composed of a soul and a body, but the soul is as much better than the body as a rational is better than an irrational, and a living than a non-living.

Man, due to the soul, is a rational living [being]. However, the care and ornament of the soul is science and becomes through science. The man either seeks science and finds it or it is acquired through instruction. However, instruction is one part transmitted directly from man to man, and another [it is given] by men who bear words as messengers from Intelligences (or, spiritual beings). But it so happened that they are in opposition to one another, and contradict to each other. Among them, some say that “There is one god”, some others say that “There is not only one god”. Some say that “He has adversaries”, but some others “There is no adversary to him”. Some say that “He has the power over everything”, but some others “He is not omnipotent”. Some say that “He is the creator of the world and all things in it”, but for some others “It is not right to consider him as the creator of all things that exist”. There are some who say that “The world is made out of nothing (ex nihilo)”, and some say that “He has made it out of matter”. There are some who say that “The world is without beginning, without end, and constant”, others otherwise imagine. There are some who say that “Men are free as regards their will”, and there are others who contradict this. And they also state many other things like these, and lay down them in their traditions, it can be seen that they contradict to one another and are in opposition to each other. And for the reason that it is not easy for us nor is it possible to accept and believe all these doctrines, except that we take one and leave the other, or we choose one and reject the other. Therefore, we need a clear knowledge on account of which we may leave the other and believe in one. However, there is no evident demonstration of this one; so then the object of these doctrines is to be sought from the faith (or, belief) as well as from the science.

So, since science brings to pass the power and beauty of the world, and the rest of [physical] souls and the joy of [celestial] spirits, then we extol more and more that faith in which any one of all these things is found; and [if] it lacks any one of these things or utters nonsense that which is opposite, we treat it with contempt and reject it, and behave with criticism towards it.

So, since science becomes perfect out of the observation and discernment of all things, the discernment [of all things] is wisdom (or, philosophy), and those who discern [all things] are called wise (or, philosopher). In wisdom theory is the best, such as the target put in front of an archer toward which he directs the gaze.

§ Everything is either spiritual (intellectual), or sensible (perceptible); and it is either a substance, or predicted of a substance, or in a substance. Since the philosophers seek to know everything, it is rightly added to the definition of philosophy this that: “as such”. If one seek to know what each one of these is, “man” or “horse” or any other thing, he does not seek out how many men or how many horses there were, or there are or there will be in the world, for this is infinite – although not for nature, but to us, and indeed what is infinite [can] not be known by us –, but [he seeks out] manhood, that is, the existence (or, substance) of man, for in “manhood” all men are equal. Science is indeed concerned with this equality, and not with the infinite. The same is true in other cases. As a result, philosophy is the exact science on [scopes ranging from] sensible things to spiritual beings, on substance, on [other ὄντα] predicated of a substance or in a substance.

§ On the other hand, philosophy is the art of all the arts, and the knowledge of all knowledge, because philosophy has prepared for all the arts or wisdoms well their instrument, and their works are sought more and more by reason of philosophy. Indeed the art of writing, the rhetoric, and other knowledge, and the junction of signs, and the composition of names and words (or, verbs), are made possible because of philosophy. And the rest of the arts also have necessarily their origin in it, whether the art of navigation or the rest of other arts. But only philosophy has prepared its own instrument and does not need any other art, and even its own works are sought more and more. Then I justly said that: Philosophy is the art of all the arts, and the knowledge of all knowledge.

§ In addition, philosophy is the likeness of divinity as far as man could be like it (or, as far as it is humanly possible). For [as] God knows and does, philosophers also in the likeness of God know and do, but [much] less.

§ Since science, as I have mentioned earlier, is in two kinds, it is necessary that philosophy is divided into two parts, one is called “theory”, the other “practice”.

And yet theory, one part, is about those which are conceivable by the mind (spiritual knowledge), and another, is about those which are perceptible to the senses, and another, is about those which are between these two, that [branch] which is also called “mathematics”

[The theory] concerning the spiritual knowledge is, for example, the knowledge of the soul, the demons, and the angels, and the basis of the world which is called “matter”, and in short, it is on invisible natures.

[The theory] concerning physics is, for example, about all those [existent falling] under generation and corruption, and in a few words, about all perceptible natures.

And [the theory] concerning mathematics, which is between the perceptible things and the spiritual beings, is divided into four kinds: first, arithmetic; and second, geometry; and third, music; and fourth, astronomy.

§ Furthermore, the other part of philosophy which is called “practice”, one part, is about general government, for example, the kingship and the government of the town, and another, is about private government, for example, the government of the house of a man, and another, about individual [guidance], for example that by which a man guides his person righteously.

§ The two parts of philosophy become known by the help of an instrument, and the instrument of philosophy is logic, which, as I said, has made philosophy, and is not from some part (or, passage) to the other portion of it.

II

§ gōbāgīh az pesāzišn ī gōbišn baved. hān ī gōbišn bahrān ī nāmcištīg do hend: ēk, nām cōn «mardōm»; ud ēk, vāxš cōn «ravendag» (raved) –bē hamāgīhā kunendag (kārnām) xvānīhed. u-š bann ōn cōn «cē», «bē», «ē», «ahanūnz», «kū», «nūn», ud abārīg [vas ī] ped ēn šōn, handāzag hend ī pesāzišn ud bann ud pedisār ud peymān ud vinārišn, ud peyrāyagīhā ī soxan gōbīhend.

§ andar nāmān avēšān ī ped gōbāgīh acārīhādar abāyend panz hend: tōhmag ud sardag ud judīh ud vāspuhragānīh ud jadišn (jahišn). tōhmag cōn «gyānvar»; sardag cōn «mardōm»; judīh cōn «gōbāg» ud «agōbāg»; vāspuhragānīh cōn «šīhag» ayāb «xannag»; ud jadišn cōn «spēdīh» ud «syāhīh».

§ tōhmag ō sē ēvēnag baxšīhed:

1. fradum, hān ī pediš mardōmān hāmōyēn ō ēk mardōm ud ēk tōhmag guft bavend, cōn jehūdagān ī-šān tōhmag ō abrāhām;
2. didīg, hān ī pediš az kū-gyāg ī kas gufsed, cōn ēd ī ka gōbem «vahmān hūzīg ped tōhmag», ud «avāhmān māyīg ped tōhmag»;
3. sidīg, hān ī ast [ōn cōn] bahr ī tōhmag ī mardōmān, frazānagān nihād, u-š acārīhā ped gōbāgīh andar abāyed. u-šān [tōhmag] ōh vimandēnīd: ēd cē abar vasān judsardagān ped hān ī ast vāxted. ōn cōn «stōr»; cē «stōr» abar asp ud xar ud abārīg ham cōn-šān tōhmag vāxted; ud vasyār hend ud ēk az did juttar ped sardag, bē ped stōrīh ēk tis hend, ud agar ō amāh pursend kū «cē ast asp?», pesox kunem kū «stōr ast»;

ah stōr ped hān ī ast vāxted.

§ sardag ast ēd cē abar vasān ī juttar ped tan ud ped stī ped hān ī ast vāxted. ōn cōn «mardōm»; cē «mardōm» abar ēd mardōm ud hān mardōm ud abārīg ham cōn sardag vāxted. ud ēk az did juttar hend ped tan ud ped stī, ud nē ped sardag. cē anī tan ud stī ī ēn, ud anī hān ī ōy, bē ped mardōmīh avēšān hamāg mardōm hend, ud agar ō amāh pursend kū «kē ast vahmān?» gōbem kū «mardōm ast». ah [mardōm] ped hān ī ast vāxted.

§ tōhmag, aziš tōhmagān tōhmag ud tōhmag ēvāz; sardag-iz, aziš sardagān sardag ud sardag ēvāz; ud aziš ped meyān ī avīn, ham hān ud ham ēn, ast ī ka sardag ud ast ī ka tōhmag, sardag ō hān ī abarīg, tōhmag ō hān ī ērīg.

ped nimōnag, ēdōn: ast tōhmag ī xvānīhed «gōhr». ud im (ham) baxšīhed ō tan ud atan. ud atan baxšīhed ō grīvān ud frēstagān ud dēvān. ud tan baxšīhed ō uštānumand ud uzuštan. ud uzuštān baxšīhed ō asmān ud zamīg ud sag ud cōb ud hāmōyēn az ēn šōn. ud uštānumand baxšīhed ō zīndag gyānumand ud abēgyān –zīndag ēvāz cōn «urvar». zīndag gyānumand baxšīhed ō gyānvar kadagīg ud daštīg, ud māhīg ud frestar ud mardōm. ud mardōm baxšīhed ō ēvāzīg tanān, ēk ēk ī mardōmān ēvāz ped stī (tan) ī ušmārišnīg ēk az did juttar hend. ā gōhr tōhmagān tōhmag, cē-š nēst anī gōhr azabar; ud mardōm sardagān sardag, cē-š nēst anī sardag azēr, mā agar ēvāz tanān ī ka baxšīhend vinast bē bavend. az baxšišn ī tōhmagān ud sardagān nē vināhišn bē anī azdīhed, ud az baxšišn ī styān ušmārišnīg vināhišn ī hān tis ī baxt ēsted. cē gyānvar ka baxšīhed mardōm ud abārīg anī sardag azdīhend; ud mardōm-iz ka baxšīhed, ēd mardōm ud ōy ī anī azdīhend, bē agar ēd mardōm baxšīhed ō hannāmān, ēd mardōm vinasted.

ēg tōhmagān tōhmag ast hān ī ēvāz tōhmag baved ud nē-z sardag. sardagān sardag ast hān ī sardag ēvāz ud nē-z tōhmag. avīn ī ped meyān ast ī ka tōhmag ud ast ī ka sardag nāmīhend. fradum sardagān sardag, ud abdum im mardōm ayāb im asp, cē imīn ī nē baxšīhend abahr ud abrīn xvānīhend. az ēdar dānist baved kū harv hān ī abar andar hamāg avīn ī ēr, bē nē harv hān ī ēr andar hamāg avīn ī abar. ēd rāy harv hān ī abar abar hān ī ēr vāxted, bē nē harv hān ī ēr abar hān ī abar vāxted. ud ānōh kū abardarīh ud ērdarīh nē, bē anīdarīh, ēn abar hān ud hān abar ēn hangōn vāxtend, ōn cōn «mardōm» abar «xannāg», ud «xannāg» abar «mardōm».

§ judīh-iz ō se ēvēnag baxšīhed:

1. naxvist, amaragānīhā ud ped visānišnīg jadišn baved, cōn «nišastan» ud «ēstādan» ud «raftan»;
2. ud didīgar, vāspuhragānīhā ud ped avisānišnīg jadišn baved, cōn «rēš ī ped tan» ud «hamōnvēnīgīh»;
3. ud sidīgar, vāspuhragānīhādar ud ped vimand ī xīrān gōbīhed, cōn «gōbāgīh» ud «agōbāgīh».

§ vāspuhragānīh-iz ō cahār ēvēnag baxšīhed:

fradum hān ī hamēšag andar harv sardag vindād ēsted, bē-š nē ēvāz andar, cōn «cahārbāyīh» andar harv asp, bē nē baved ēvāz andar-š;

ud didīgar, hān ī andar sardag-ē ēvāz, bē nē andar harvisp ud nē-z ped harv zamān, cōn «spēdmōyīh ped pērīh» sardag ī mardōmān rāy, bē nē ped harv zamān nē-z andar hamāg;

ud sidīgar, hān ī andar ēk sardag ēvtāg vindād ēsted, bē nē andar hamāg hamsardagān, cōn «zamīgpeymānīh» andar sardag ī mardōmān;

ud tasum, hān ī ēk sardāg rāy ēvāz ast ud ped harv zamān, cōn «xannāgīh» andar mardōm ud «šīhagīh» andar asp. ēd rāy ēn ēvēnag ēvāz ast vāspuhragānīh ī vizurd.

u-š vimand ēdōn: ēd cē ka andar tis, nē baved cōn bahr ī-š ast andar, ud nē tuvān būdan ped stī bē az hān cē-š ast andar.

anī-z: hān cē adīhed ud uzīhed bē az vināhišn ī hān ī andar-š āyed ud aziš bē šaved.

<II. Isagoge>

§ Logic comes to pass out of the composition of a speech. The special parts of a speech are two: One, noun such as “man”; and the other, verb such as “walking” – however it is also generally called participle. Particles [of speech] such as “for”, “but”, “again”, “yet”, “i.e.”, “then”, and others like these, are like combination and conjunction and affixing (sequence) and metre (measurement) and [grammatical] construction, and are called the ornaments of sentences.

§ The terms (names) which are quite necessarily required in logic are five in number: genus, species, differentia, property, and accident. Genus is like animal, species like man, difference like rational and irrational, property like neighing and [the faculty of] laughter, and accident like whiteness and blackness.

§ Genus is divided into three sorts:

1. One sort concerns the multitude of all those men who have alliance to each other from one man or one genus; for example, the genus of all Jews is linked to Abraham.
2. Another sort concerns the place from whence a man comes; for example, when we say that so-and-so is an Hūzian (an Elamite) by genus, and the other is a Median by genus.
3. The third which concerns a part of the genus [as genus] –the genus of human beings – is set by philosophers, and it is necessarily required in logic. It is defined by them thus: That which is predicated of several items differing in species, as such. For example, “large-domestic-animal”. Large-domestic-animal, being a genus, is indeed predicated of horse and donkey and others like these; they are several [in number] and differ from one another in species, nevertheless in [their] being large domestic animals they are one [and the same] thing. And if we are asked, “What is a horse?”, we answer “It is a large domestic animal.”

Then large-domestic-animal is predicated of it [in answer] to what it is.

§ A species is what is predicated of several items differing as proper in person and as individual substances, as such, for example, man. “Man” indeed is predicated, as a species, of this man, that man, and the others. They are different from each other as individuals and in person, but not in species. This one has an individual existence and a proper person, that one has another, [and the like], but they are all “men” as human beings. And if we are asked, “Who is so-and-so?”, we answer “He is a man.” Then it (“man”) is predicated as such.

§ Of genera, some are most general and only genera, and again of species, some are most special and only species, and there are some other items between these, the same item being sometimes species and sometimes genus, species of what is superordinate and genus of what is subordinate.

Now the matter is illustrated by an example: There is one genus which is called “substance”. It is divided into [corporate] body and incorporeal. The non-body is divided into souls and angels and demons. Body is divided into animate and non-animate. Non-animate is divided into sky and earth, stones and woods and all such things. Animate is divided into living with breathing soul and without breathing soul – living only, such as trees. And living creatures with breathing soul are divided into domesticated animals and wild animals, fishes and reptiles and men. Man is divided into singular persons; the men one by one only differ from each other as persons [differing] in number. Substance is thus the most general, because there is no other genus above it; and man is the most special, because there is no other species below it but only individuals –if they be divided, they will be destroyed. By the dividing up of genera and species, there will be no destruction but another thing will be known; while by the dividing up of the individuals [differing] in number, there will be the destruction of that which is divided up. Indeed when animal is divided, man and the rest of other species are known. Again when man is divided, this man and the other are known. But if this man be divided into members, this man will be destroyed.

Then most general is that which, being only a genus, is not a species. And most special is that which, being only a species, is not a genus. Those which are between [a genus and a species] are mentioned sometimes as genera and sometimes as species (that is, species of one item and genera of another). The first item is most general, and the last this man or this horse, those items which, as they are not divided, are called “indivisible” and “unsplittable” (atomic). Hence it is manifest that, every item which is above is [found] in all those which are below, but it is not [true] that every item which is below is found in any item which is above. That’s why any item which is above is predicated of any which is under it, but not any item which is below is predicated of any above it. Where there is neither the quality of being above (“aboveness”) or below (“belowness”) but diversity (“otherness”), this item is predicated of that and at the same time that item is predicated of this, for example, man is predicated of laughing, and equally laughing of man.

§ Difference also is divided into three sorts:

1. One, an item is commonly different [from a diverse item] in virtue of some separable accident, for example, “to sit down”, “to stand up”, and “to walk”;
2. Another, an item is properly different [from a diverse item] with respect to some inseparable accident, for example, “a sore on the body”, “being snub-nosed”;
3. And the third, an item is said most properly [different from a diverse item], with respect to the definition of things (that is, it varies by specific difference), for example, “being rational” and “being non-rational”.

§ As to property, it is also divided into four sorts:

One, it is that which happens always to a whole species, though not to that alone, for example, “having four feet” applies to every horse, but not to that alone;

Another, it is that which happens to some one species alone, though not to every [individual of that species], nor all the time, for example, gray hairs in old age applies to the human species, but not all the time nor to every [individual of it];

Third, it is that which happens to some one species alone, though not to every individual of that species, for example, geometrizing applies to the human species;

And fourth, it is that which holds of some one species alone, and applies to every [individual] of it, and all the time, for example, risibility applies to man, and neighing to horse.

Then this [fourth] sort only is the genuine property.

Its definition is thus: That which, when it is in something, is not as a part (μέρος) of that in which it is nor can be without that in which it is so as to exist by itself.

Again otherwise: That which comes in and goes out without the destruction (φθορά) of that in which it comes and of which it goes [out].

III

hamnāmīh: ka do ayāb vas ī jud hend ped vimand, ped ēk nām xvānīhend, ōn cōn sag ī zamīgīg, ud sag ī ābīg, ud sag ī kay, ud sag ī nigār, cē ēn hamāg rāy ēk nām ast, bē ped vimand jud hend.

hamīh ī nām ud vimand: ka do ayāb vas hamsardag ēk nām dārend, cōn nām ī «gyānvar»; mardōm, asp, ud abārīg harv [gyānvar] ped nām ī «gyānvar» hāvand hend.

vasnāmīh: ka ēk tis rāy do ayāb vas nām ast, cōn xvar ī xvānīhed ped pārsīg uzvān abdāb, xvarxšēd, ud mihr.

judnāmīh: ka vas tis ped vas nām nīsend, [cōn] asmān, zamīg, urvar, mardōm.

nāmgīrīh: ka az nām-ē anī nām nihend, cōn az āhangarīh āhangar, ud cē.

fīlāsōfā bāstān bē hamnāmīh ud āgenīnnāmīh ud judnāmīh enyā ō kār nē bared.

§ az hān cōn nām mādayān abar astag tis nišāsted, a-mān naxvist sazed dānistan kū harv hān ī ast gōhr ast ayāb jadišn.

§ gōhr, aziš amaragānīg, ud aziš ēvāzīg. amaragānīg cōn «mardōm», ud ēvāzīg cōn «ēd mardōm».

jadišn-z hamgōnag, aziš amaragānīg, ud aziš ēvāzīg. amaragānīg cōn «spēdīh», ud ēvāzīg cōn «ēd spēdīh».

gōhr, aziš fradum, ud aziš did, ud aziš sid gōbīhed. fradum, burzīdag ud māyagvar, ud frāydar gufsed kū ast hān ī andar tanān ud kasān, cōn «ēd mardōm». ud did, sardagān sardag, cōn «mardōm» amaragānīg. ud sid-iz hān ī andar tōhmag, cōn «gyānvar».

gōhr ped rāh ī daxšagān ī xvēš azdīhed ī hend:

1. hān ī nēst andar tis, bē-š harv tis andar;
2. ud hān ī-š nām ud vimand dahed ō harv tis ī abar-š gufsed;
3. u-d hān ī-š nēst hambun-z pedīrag;
4. ud hān ī-š andar nēst vēšīh ud kamīh;
5. ud hān ī ēvāz ēd tis nišānēned;
6. ud hān ī ka ēk ud ham, ēg pedīragān pedīrišnīg baved.

§ jadišn-z ō nō tōhmag baxšīhed: candīh, zanag (cōnīh), āvann (bastagīh), kū (kūgyāg), kay, nīsād (nihād), dāšt, kunišn (kunāg), kirīyišn (kirīyāg). candīh cōn «mar»; zanag cōn «spēdīh» ud «syāhīh»; bastagīh cōn «xvadāy ud bannag»; kū cōn «Āsūrestān»; kay cōn «dīg», «imrōz», «fradāg»; nihād cōn «nišastag», «āxistag»; dāšt cōn «kas ī zan gīred» ayāb «xvāstag-ē dāred»; kunāg cōn «burred»; kirīyāg cōn «burrīhed».

§ candīh, aziš bahrān ēk az did visāndag, [cōn] mar, soxan; ud aziš [bahrān] peyvastag ud abēvisānišn, [cōn] drahnāy, pahnāy, zufāy, gyāg, zamān.

tuvānīgīh ud atuvānīgīh, cōn «mardōm dibīrīh tuvān hamuxtan», ud «asp dibīrīh nē tuvān hamuxtan».

bavandagīh ud abavandagīh, cōn «mard bavandagīhā dāned dibīrīh» ayāb «tis ī vas šīrēn» ud «tis ī vas taxl», ayāb abavandagīhā ped avīn («mard kam dāned dibīrīh» ayāb «tis ī kam šīrēn» ud «kam taxl»), ud hamāg ped im šōn.

ud brahmag cōn «girdag», «sigōš», «cahārgōš»; ud gōnag cōn «spēdīh» ud «syāhīh».

§ ud āvann cōn «dašn» ud «hōy», «abar» ud «ēr», «pid» ud «pus», ud hamāg ped im šōn.

§ ud abārīg anī tōhmag az hān ī azabar nimūd azdīhed.

<III. Categories>

Now, homonym: when two or many things, differing in definition, are called by one name, for example, terrestrial dog, aquatic dog, Orion’s dog (Canis Major), and painted dog (or, the dog-star, Sirius), for all of these have one name, but differ in definition.

Having in common both name and definition (synonym): when two or many things of the same species (genus), have one name, for example, the name of “animal”; man, horse and the other all agree in the name of “animal”.

Polyonym: when one thing has two or many names, for example, Sun is called, in Pārsīg language, “Abdāb”, “Xvarxšēd”, “Mihr”.

Heteronym (different in name): when many things are named with many names, [for example,] sky, earth, woods, man.

Paronym (derivative): when some name is ×derived from some other name, for example, blacksmith from blacksmithing, etc.

The philosopher (i. e., Aristotle) usually only makes use of homonyms and synonyms and heteronyms.

§ Now, since a name is strictly used to designate something that exists, we primarily ought to know that everything that exists is substance or accident.

§ Substance is, one part, common (or, universal), and another, particular (or, singular). Indeed, the common [substance] is, for example, “man”, while the particular [substance] is, for example, “this man”.

Similarly, accident also is, one part, common (or, universal), and another, particular (or, singular). Indeed, the common [accident] is, for example, “whiteness”, while the particular [accident] is, for example, “this whiteness”.

Substance is called, one part, primary, and another, secondary, and another, tertiary. The primary, the valuable and properly named [substance], which is most of all said that it is that which is in individuals and persons, for example, “this man” (or, the individual man). The next [substance] is the most special, for example, the “man in general”. And again, the third [substance] is that which is in general [of these species], for example, “animal”.

One recognizes a substance through its peculiar characteristics which are as follows:

1. That which is not in a thing (subject), but everything is in it;
2. That which gives its name and definition to all things which are said of it;
3. That which has nothing contrary to it;
4. That in which there is neither the state of being more (excess) nor the state of being less (deficiency);
5. That which signifies “this thing” only;
6. That which, when it is one and the same, is able to receive contraries.

§ Accidents are divided into nine genera: quantity, quality (qualification), relation (relative), where, when, being in a position, possessing, acting, being affected. Quantity is, for example, number; quality is, for example, whiteness and blackness; relation, for example, lord and servant; somewhere, for example, Āsūrestān (Bēθ Armāyē); at some time, for example, yesterday, today, tomorrow; being in a position, for example, sitting, standing; possessing, for example, one who takes on a wife, or possesses something; acting, for example, cutting off; being acted, for example, being cut off.

§ Some quantities are with parts separated from each other (discrete), [for example], number, speech; and the others connected (continuous) and without separation, [for example], length, breadth, depth, place, time.

[The second sort of quality, viz. natural] capacity and incapacity, [is that in virtue of which,] for example, [we call] man is able to learn the art of writing, and horse is not capable to learn it.

Examples of [the third sort of quality], completeness and deficiency: A man who perfectly knows the art of writing, something which is very sweet or very bitter, or a man who too little knows the art of writing, or something which taste is a little sweet or a little bitter, and the like.

Figures are like [something] curved, triangle, quadrangle. Colours are like whiteness and blackness, redness and pallor.

§ Relatives are, for example, right and left, upward and downward, father and son, and the like.

§ The rest of the other genera are partly made known through the above demonstration.

IV

§ az hān cōn-um guft, gōbāgīh az gōbišn; ud gōbišn az nām ud vāxš. fradum sazed vimandēnīdan kū cē nām ud cē vāxš; hamēdōn, cē xustūgīh ud nigīrāyīh ud vizīr ud gōbišn.

§ nām ast vāng-ē nišānēnāg, daxšagumandīhā, abēzamān, ī ka bahr-ē aziš judāg baved, ēc nē nišānēned, cōn «mardōm».

§ ud vāxš ast vāng-ē nišānēnāg, daxšagumandīhā, zamānumand, ēd ī ka bahr-ē aziš judāg baved ēc nē nišānēned, cōn hān ī «ravān» («hamē raved»).

§ az nām ud vāxš gōbišn baved. gōbišn ast vāng-ē nišānēnāg, daxšagumandīhā, ī ka-z bahr-ē aziš judāg baved [ahanūn-z] tis nišānēned, cōn «mardōm raved».

§ xustūgīh gōbišn vizīrīg ī tis abar tis nihed, ōn cōn «mardōm mīrāg ast». nigīrāyīh gōbišn-z vizīrīg ī tis az tis abar dāred, ōn cōn «mardōm mīrāg nēst». ud jumā pēšnihād xvand ēstend, ud yōnīgān prótasis xvānend. rāstīh ud drōvīh (vaxrīh) bē gōbišn vizīrīg enyā nē vinded, cē kē gōbed kū «mardōm mīrāg ast» rāst gōbed, ud kē «mardōm nē mīrāg» vaxr drāyed. bē abārīg ī hend cahār anī ēvēnag, cōn-um azabar nibišt, ka guft ēstend, nē rāstīh nišānēnd ud nē drōvīh. ēd rāy frazānagān gōbišn vizīrīg dōšend abar az [abārīg gōbišnān], cē frazānagān rāstīh ud drōvīh abāyend dānistan kū dā drōvīh bē zanend ud rāstīh nigāh dārend.

§ az hān cōn gōbišn abar xīr gufsed ayāb abar xīr humānāg, ud xīr ayāb xīr humānāg guft baved ayāb menīd baved ayāb nibišt baved, a-mān sazed dānistan kū xīr ud parmānag harv kas rāy ham, bē gōbišn ud nibēg harv kas rāy nē ham. cim ēn kū xīr ud menišn ped cihr hend, bē cihr harv kas rāy ham. az hān cōn kas šāyed guftan tis ī ast cōn hān ī ast, ud tis ī nēst cōn hān ī nēst, anīz tis ī ast cōn hān ī nēst, ud tis ī nēst cōn hān ī ast, sazed dānistan kū rāstīh ayāb vaxrīh ped do ēvēnag: cē kē tis ī ast cōn ast ud tis ī nēst cōn nēst gōbed rāst gōbed, bē kē tis ī ast cōn nēst ud tis ī nēst cōn ast gōbed vaxr drāyed.

§ pedīrag ī hamāgīg hambidīg xvānend; ud hān ī bahrīg pedīzak; ud do pedīrag, hamāgīg ud bahrīg, hān ī-š harv do pēšnihād xustūgīh, ud hān ī-š harv do pēšnihād nigīrāyīh, aziškeh xvand ēstend; ud do anī pedīrag, ēk, hān ī-š ēk pēšnihād xustūgīh ī hamāgīg bē ōy ī anī nigīrāyīh ī bahrīg, ud did, hān-z ī-š ēk pēšnihād nigīrāyīh ī hamāgīg bē anī xustūgīh ī bahrīg, andarggōbišn xvand ēstend, ud yōnīgān ἀntífasis xvānend.

§ az hān cōn harv cē gufsed, ast ī hamvār ēdōn ast,

cōn «do ud do cahār»;

bē ast ī nē harvzamān ēdōn, mā agar gāh-ē ēdōn, cōn «Plátōn raved»;

ud ast-iz ī hagriz nē ēdōn, cōn «do ud do šaš».

pedīrag ī hamāgīg ī hambidīg, ped māyag ī acārīg: hamvār xustūgīh rāst gōbed, bē nigīrāyīh drōv drāyed, ōn cōn «harv mardōm mīrāg» ud «ēc mardōm mīrāg nē». ud pedīrag ī bahrīg ī xvand ēsted pedīzak, ud avīn do ī-šān xvānend aziškeh, ped māyag ī acārīg: kadār-z-ē xustōgīh hamvār rāst gōbed, bē nigīrāyīh drōv drāyed, ōn cōn «mardōm-ē mīrāg» – «mardōm-ē mīrāg nē», «harv mardōm mīrāg» – «mardōm-ē mīrāg », «ēc mardōm mīrāg nē» – «nē harv mardōm mīrāg».

bē ped māyag ī tuvānīg, pedīrag ī hamāgīg ī hambidīg: harv do pēšnihād hamvār vaxr drāyend, «harv mardōm frazānag» – «ēc mardōm nē frazānag». ud pedīrag hān ī aziškeh xvand ēsted, hān ī-š harv do pēšnihād xustūgīh, pēšnihād kōcak hamvār rāst gōbed ud vazurg hamvār drōv drāyed, ōn cōn «harv mardōm frazānag» – «mardōm-ē frazānag», anīz ped hān ī anī pedīrag ī aziškeh hān ī-š harv do pēšnihād nigīrāyīh, kōcak hamvār rāst gōbed ud vazurg hamvār drōv drāyed, ōn cōn «ēc mardōm nē frazānag» – «nē harv mardōm frazānag». ud pedīrag ī bahrīg ud pedīzak, harv do pēšnihād rāst gōbend, ōn cōn «mardōm-ē dibīr» – «mardōm-ē dibīr nē».

ud ped māyag ī nē-šāyed-būd, pedīrag ī hamāgīg ī hambidīg: nigīrāyīh hamvār rāst gōbed bē xustūgīh drōv drāyed, ōn cōn «harv mardōm sag» – «ēc mardōm nē sag». ud pedīrag ī aziškeh, hān ī-š harv do pēšnihād xustūgīh, harv do drōv drāyend, ōn cōn «harv mardōm asp» – «mardōm-ē asp», ud hān ī anī pedīrag ī aziškeh, hān ī-š harv do pēšnihād nigīrāyīh, harv do rāst gōbend, ōn cōn «ēc mardōm nē sag» – «nē harv mardōm sag». ud hamēdōn, pedīrag ī pedīzak, nigīrāyīh rāst gōbed ud xustūgīh drōv drāyed, ōn cōn «mardōm-ē asp» – «ēc mardōm asp nē».

§ pedīrag ī abēparvann, ped māyag ī acārīg: xustūgīh hamvār rāst gōbed, bē nigīrāyīh drōv drāyed, ōn cōn «mardōm xannāg ast» – «mardōm xannāg nēst». ud ped māyag ī tuvānīg, harv do pēšnihād tuvān rāst guftan, ōn cōn «mardōm dibīr ast» – «mardōm dibīr nēst». ud ped māyag ī nē-šāyedbūd, nigīrāyīh hamvār rāst gōbed, bē xustūgīh drōv drāyed, ōn cōn «mardōm sang ast» – «mardōm sag nēst».

§ nūn gōbem abar donān pedīragān ī-šān hambasān xvānend. jumā, ped sē māyag, ka ped ham zamān, ō ham kas, abar ham xīr gufsend, hamvār ēk pēšnihād rāst gōbed, ud did drōv drāyed, ud hagriz ēk abāg did nē ped rāstīh hamdādestān nē ped vaxrīh, bē hamvār rāstīh ud vaxrīh andar ēv did baxšend, ud ēk rāstīh vizined ud did vaxrīh.

§ ud pedīrag-iz ī nāmcištīg hamgōnag ka ped ham [zamān], ud ō ham [kas], ud abar ham [xīr] bē gufsed, hamvār ēk pēšnihād rāst gōbed bē anī vaxr drāyed.

§ ah andar harv dānišn ud zīrīh, ud ped hangird, andar harv pehikār ud uskār, pedīrag hān ī hambasān xvand ēsted ēd rāy abāyend cē hamvār ped ēk rāst baved ud ped did drōv.

ēg avīn pedīragān abar sē zamān sē bār bavend.

§ did pēšnihād aziš sādag ī az ēk nām ud vāxš-ē pesāxt ēsted, cōn «ātaš garm», ud ast ī nē az do ēvāz, cōn «ātaš garm ast». ēdōn-z pedīrag vas kunend.

§ did, ast nām ī xvand ēsted abēvimand, cōn «nē-mardōm», ped ham ēvēnag vāxš-iz cōn «nē-drust», ud az ēdar-z pedīragīhā abzūd bavend.

cē hān ī tuvān būdan, tuvān nē būdan.

§ abar māyag ī tuvānīh ped daxšag, sazed zastan kū: harv cē-š pediš gufsed ēvāz acār ud nē-šāyed ast, ayāb anīz ēd ast ī xvānīhed tuvānīg?

gōbem kū: agar harv cē gufsed «acār baved» ayāb «acār nē baved», ēg āfrāh ud vifrāh, ēvēn ud framān ud avvēnišn, ud nikōhišn ud nigerišn ud toxšišn, ud jādaggōbīh ud zayišn nē abāyistan ud nē dādan ud nē-z kirdan. cē ēn hamāg pedisāy hān ī tuvān baved ud tuvān nē baved kunem ud pardāzem. ā ast tuvānīgīh. enyā, agar kirbakkarān kirbag ud bazakkarān bazag acār bē kunend, ēg āfrīn ud nifrīn ud mizd ud pādifrāh nē dādan ud nē tuxtan; bē āšnāg kū dahem ud tōzem. ā ast tuvānīgīh. ud ōy kē pediš nē hamdādestān a-š tar menem u-š ped halaggōbišn dārem, u-š ped nikōhišn ō pedīrag ēstem.

<IV. On Interpretation>

§ So as I have already said, logic [stems] from speech (discourse), and speech from noun and verb (word), we should first define what the noun is and what the verb; furthermore, what an affirmation is, and what a negation (denial), an indicative sentence, and a speech.

§ A noun is a [spoken] sound significant by convention, without reference to time, and of which no part is significant if it be separated, for example, “man”.

§ And a verb is a [spoken] sound significant by convention, and at the same time [carries with it the notion of] time, and of which no part is significant if it be separated, for example, “walks” (“is-walking”).

§ A speech consists of a noun and a verb. A speech is a [spoken] sound significant by convention, and if some part of it be separated it may signify something, for example, “Man walks.”

§ Affirmation is an enunciative sentence which asserts something about something, for example, “Man is mortal”. Negation is also an enunciative sentence, but it denies something of something, for example, “Man is not mortal”. Both [enunciative or assertoric sentences] are called “proposition”, and the Greeks call them “πρότασις”. Truth or falsity (lie) is only found in an enunciative sentence. One who says “Man is mortal” is true, and one who [says] “Man is not mortal” is false. But the rest of the other four sorts [of sentence], as written above, when stated, do signify neither truth nor falsity. Therefore, philosophers treat with reverence (or, prefer) the enunciative sentence, for the philosophers seek to know truth and falsity, in order to reject the falsity and behold the truth.

§ Since a sentence is either stated about the things or the likenesses of things, and the things or the likenesses of things are either said or thought or written, we should know that the things and the thoughts (concepts) are the same for all, but the discourses (words) and the writings (letters) are not the same for all. The reason is this that the things and the thoughts are by nature, and nature is the same for all. Now since one can state what hold as holding (or, what is is), and what does not hold as not holding, and also what holds as not holding, and what does not hold as holding, I should point out that the truth or the falsity may occur in two sorts, for one who states what holds as holding and what does not hold as not holding says the truth, but one who states what holds as not holding and what does not hold as holding speaks falsely.

§ The universal opposite is called contrary, and the particular one subcontrary. Those two opposites, [between] universal and particular [statements], that which has two affirmative propositions, and that which has two negative propositions, are called subalterns. And as for those two other opposites, one with a universal affirmative proposition and a particular negative proposition, while the second with a universal negative proposition and a particular affirmative proposition, are called contradictories – the Greeks call [this kind of opposition] ἀντίφασις ‘contradiction’.

§ Now, everything that is said, [is presented as follows:]

It is always the case, for example, “Two and two make four”;

It is not always the case, but sometimes it is the case, for example, “Plato walks”;

And yet it is never the case, for example, “Two and two make six”.

Now, as for the universal opposite [which is called] contrary, in necessary matter, the affirmation is always true, and the negation false, for example, “Every man is mortal” –and – “No man is mortal”. And also as for the particular opposite which is called subcontrary, and those two [opposites] which are called subaltern, in the necessary matter, the affirmation is always true, and the negation false, for example, “Some man is mortal” – “Some man is not mortal”, “Every man is mortal” – “Some man is mortal”, and “No man is mortal” – “Not every man is mortal” (or, “Some man is not mortal”).

But in the contingent matter, as for the universal opposite [i.e.] the contrary, both propositions are always false, [for example,] “Every man is philosopher” –and – “No man is philosopher”. And as for the opposites which are called subaltern, the opposite with two affirmative propositions, its minor proposition (premiss) is always true but its major one always false, for example, “Every man is philosopher” –and – “Some man is philosopher”; likewise, as for another opposite which is subaltern with two negative propositions the minor is indeed always true but the major is always false, for example, “No man is philosopher” – “Not every man is philosopher”. And yet, as for the particular opposite [i.e.] the subcontrary, both propositions are true, for example, “Some man writes” (or, “Some man is literate”) – “Some man does not write”.

And in the impossible matter, as for the universal opposite, that is, the contrary, the negative sentence is always true, but the affirmative sentence false, for example, “Every man is a stone” –and – “No man is a stone”. And as for the subaltern opposite, [if] it be with two affirmative propositions, both are false, for example, “Every man is a horse” – “Some man is a horse”; [if] it be with two negative propositions, both are true, for example, “No man is a stone” – “Not every man is a stone”. And likewise, as for the opposite which is subcontrary, the negation is true, but the affirmation is false, for example, “Some man is a horse” – “Some man is not a horse”.

§ But as for the unquantified (undetermined) opposite: In the necessary matter, the affirmation is always true, while the negation false, for example, “Man is laughing” – “Man is not laughing”. And in the contingent matter, both propositions might be true, for example, “Man is a writer” – “Man is not a writer”. And in the impossible matter, the negation is always true, [while] the affirmation false, for example, “Man is a stone” – “Man is not a stone”.

§ Now we talk about these two opposites which are called ἀντίφασις (‘contradiction’ or ‘contradictory antithesis’). In fact, when they are said, on these three [modal] matters, at the same time, with the same person (subject), on the same object (predicate), one proposition is always true, while the other false, and they never agree with each other in truth or falsehood, but they always divide the truth and falsehood between each other, on the one hand one [proposition] chooses truth, on the other hand the other [proposition] falsehood.

§ Likewise, as for the individual opposite, when [the pair of singular sentences] are said simultaneously with the same [subject], on the same [object], one proposition is always true, while the other false.

§ Therefore, [in] all sciences and philosophies, briefly, in any disputation (or, verbal duel) and deliberation (or, colloquy), of all the opposites, those which are called ἀντίφασις (‘contradiction’) are most required, and this on account of the fact that it is always the case that one [of the pair of sentences] is true, while the other is false.

Those opposites, on the basis of these three tenses are multiplied by three.

§ Yet of simple propositions some are composed of only a noun and a verb, for example, “Fire burns”, and some are not of only two [terms], for example, “Fire is burning”. And in this way also [the number of] opposites is multiplied.

§ Again there are nouns which are called indefinite, for example, “not man”, and likewise [there are] verbs [called indefinite], for example, “(is) not wholesome”. And from here also [the number of] opposites is added.

In fact, that which is contingent that it is, it is contingent that it is not.

§ On the matter of contingency in indication, we should now ask that: Everything which is said in it, is it only necessary or impossible, or is there another [mode] which is called contingent?

We answer that: If everything which is said be necessary to be or necessary not to be, then there is no need to seek or give or even do [moral or religious obligations, such as] the advices and admonitions, laws and commands, reproofs and rebukes, contemplation and exhortation, persuasion and petition. We do and deal all these because of that which is contingent to be and is contingent not to be. Then contingency exists. Otherwise, if it be necessary that good ones do good and evil ones do evil, then praise or complaint or remuneration (or, retribution) or punishment are vain to give or do, but it is manifest that we give and do [these things]. Then contingency exists. And whoever does not adhere [to this conclusion], we consider him as a miserable and vain-speaking, and behave reprovingly towards him.

V

§ az hān cōn pedīrag ī hamāgīg ud bahrīg, az abēparvann ud nāmcištīg hāmis, ašt, u-šān pēšnihād šāzdah hend, a-mān sazed dānistan kū harv ēk pēšnihād jud az hān ī «hamāg» ayāb «bahr» nišānēnd, do bahr-z dāred: ēk nīsādag ud did vāxtag xvānend. cē kē gōbed kū «mardōm zīndag», «mardōm» nīsed, u-š «zīndag» abar vāxt baved; ud kē gōbed kū «mardōm nē zīndag», abāz «mardōm» nīsed, u-š «nē zīndag» abar vāxt baved.

§ pēšnihād hamāgīg ud bahrīg ī ped xustūgīh harv do ped hān ī bahrīg vardīhend, ōn cōn agar «harv mardōm gyānvar» <ud «mardōm-ē gyānvar» >, ēg-iz «gyānvar-ē mardōm». ud nigīrāyīh ī hamāgīg hamāgīhā vardīhed, ōn cōn «ēc mardōm asp nē», ēg-iz «ēc asp mardōm nē». nigīrāyīh-iz ī bahrīg ped hān ī bahrīg vardīhed, cē agar «mardōm-ē asp nē», ēg « asp-ē mardōm nē». ud nigīrāyīh ī abēparvann ud nāmcištīg-iz, ped ham ēvēnag, cōn hān ī bahrīg.

§ anī [pēšnihād] hān ī ul āyed, ud anī hān ī frōd šaved. hān ī ul āyed hamvār rāst gōbed, bē hān ī frōd šaved bāstān vaxr drāyed. ul-āmadān ōn cōn «harv mardōm gyānvar» rāst gōbed, bē frōd-šudān ōn cōn «harv gyānvar mardōm» zīfān drāyed.

§ did, vardišn baved ēd ī ka hān ī nīsād vāxt baved ud hān ī vāxt nīsād baved, ōn cōn «mardōm zīndag» ud «zīndag mardōm».

§ hān ī nīsād ud hān ī vāxt sāmān nāmīhend. ud hamē ka do pēšnihād sādag ēk ō did abyōzend, ped ēk sāmān bannīhend.

cē ēdar andar do pēšnihād, andar hān ī frdaum kū «harv mardōm gyānvar» «mardōm» nīsād ēsted u-š «gyānvar» abar vāxt ēsted, ud andar hān ī anī kū «harv gyānvar gyānumand» «gyānvar» nīsād ēsted u-š «gyānumand» abar vāxt ēsted. ud hān ī pēšnihād kū «harv mardōm gyānvar», ud hān ī «harv gyānvar gyānumand», harv do ped «gyānvar» bannīhend ēd cē andar fradum pēšnihād vāxtag ud andar didīgar nīsādag.

ēdar andar harv do pēšnihād, andar hān ī «harv mardōm gyānvar» ud andar-z hān ī «harv asp gyānvar», «mardōm» ud «asp» [ped sāmān ī «gyānvar»] ēk ō did bast ēstend.

ēdar ped pēšnihād ī «harv dibīr mardōm» «dibīr» nīsād ēsted u-š «mardōm» abar vāxted, ud ped hān-z ī «harv dibīr gōbāg» dibīr nīsād ēsted u-š «gōbāg» abar vāxted. ud ē do pēšnihād …

§ … ud ped hamāgīh hanzām, drōv ī xvānīhed paraloγismόs (viyābāngōbišnīh), andar-š kār dārend.

§ sē brahmag ī hangōšīdag, ēk fradum, ud anī didīgar, ud anī-z sidīgar xvānend.

§ brahmag ud zanag ī hangōšīdag, hān ī rāst ud hān ī nē:

§ andar brahmag ī fradum:

§ brahmag ī didīgar:

§ brahmag ī siyum:

bē ka nē andar ēc, cōn «mardōm nē andar ēc stōr», …

§ az ēd cē guft dānist baved kū pēšnihādīhā – kū-šān prótasis xvānend – , āstavānīhā sazed nīsādīhistan, ud az avīn ī sazāgīhā āstavānīhend, hanzām kunišn, ud ped im ēvēnag dānišnīgīh ī ēd cē abāyem baved.

§ ud andar ēn se brahmag, hamē ka harv do pēšnihād nigīrāyīh, jumā bahrīg-iz, hagriz frazām acārīg nē baved.

ud ped brahmag ī fradum, andar juxt hān ī-š vazurg xustūgīh hamāgīg, bē-š kōcak nigīrāyīh hamāgīg, ud ped brahmag ī didīgar, andar juxt hān ī-š vazurg nigīrāyīh bahrīg, <ud ped brahmag ī sidīgar, andar juxt hān ī-š kōcak nigīrāyīh>, hambun-z frazām nē acārīg.

ud ped hāmōyēn brahmag, agar juxt ī do pēšnihād nigīrāyīh, hambun-z frazām nē acārīg; ud agar andar juxt ēk ast nigīrāyīh, hambun-z frazām xustūgīh nē vinded.

ud ped brahmag ī didīgar frazām xustūgīh nē, nē-z ped brahmag ī sidīgar hān ī hamāgīg ud acārīg andar ēc zanag.

ka hān ī hamāgīg rāst, bahrīg-iz; bē nē agar bahrīg [rāst], hamāgīg-iz.

ēdōn hangōšīdag ī-š aziš pēdāgīhed rāstīh ud vaxrīh, ped mar cahārdah: ped brahmag ī fradum cahār, ped brahmag ī didīgar cahār, ud ped   brahmag ī sidīgar šaš. jud az imīn nēst.

§ brahmag hān ī ast spurrīg, ī-š andar frazām xustūgīh hamāgīg vinded ud nigīrāyīh-iz hamāgīg anīz ham xustūgīh bahrīg ud ham nigīrāyīh bahrīg; ud hāmōyen andar brahmag ī fradum vindād hend, ah ēvar ē brahmag fradum ud spurrīg nāmīhed.

bē brahmag ī didīgar hō vasnād cē-š nēst frazām xustūgīh hamāgīg ud bahrīg, ud brahmag ī sidīgar hō vasnād cē-š nēst frazām hamāgīg xustūgīh ud nigīrāyīh anespurrīg xvānīhend.

§ ēd do brahmag ī nē spurrīg, acārīhā az hān ī spurrīg spurrīgīhend. ēg brahmag ī duvum ud hān ī siyum, ped spurrīgīh rāy, ō hān ī naxvist niyāzumand hend. ud ped do ēvēnag az hān spurrīgīhend: ēk, ped vardēnišn ī pēšnihād, ud did ped atuvānīgīh. ēdōn cōn-um azabar guft, nigīrāyīh hamāgīg hamāgīhā vardīhed, cē agar «nē andar ēc mardōm asp», ēg-iz «nē andar ēc asp mardōm».

ēdōn vizārd ēsted: agar «a nē andar ēc c», ēg «c nē andar ēc a», ud «a andar harv b», ēg-iz «c nē andar ēc b», ud did «b nē andar ēc c». ud vizārd ēsted ēn zanag ī ast naxvist andar brahmag ī didīgar ō zanag ī duvum andar brahmag ī fradum, ped do vardēnišn.

cē agar «a nē andar ēc b», ēg-iz «b nē andar ēc a», ud cōn «a andar harv c», ā «b nē andar ēc c». ud vizārd baved ēn zanag ī ast duvum andar brahmag ī didīgar ō hān ī duvum zanag ī andar brahmag ī fradum.

cē agar «a nē andar ēcand b», ēg-iz «b nē andar ēc a», ud cōn «a andar ēcand c», ā «b nē andar harv c». ud vizārd ēsted ēn zanag ī ast siyum andar brahmag ī didīgar ō zanag ī tasum andar brahmag ī fradum.

ud ēn zanag ped atuvānīgīh spurrīgīhed, ōn cōn agar «b nē andar harv c» nē rāst, ēg «b andar harv c» rāst. ud nīsād ēsted kū «a andar harv b», ā «a andar harv c». bē ē nē rāst, cē nihād ēsted kū «a nē andar harv c». ā nē rāst kū «b andar harv c». bē-š [hamēstār] rāst. ud vizārd ēsted ēn zanag ī ast tasum andar brahmag ī didīgar, ō zanag ī naxvist andar brahmag ī fradum ped rāh ī atuvānīgīh.

§  did, cōn-mān azabar guft, pēšnihād xustūgīh, jumā hamāgīg ud bahrīg, anīz parzāyāg bahrīg, hāmōyēn ō bahrīg vardīhend. cē agar «mardōm andar harv dibīr», ēg-iz «dibīr andar mardōm-ē»; ud agar «dibīr andar mardōm-ē», ēg-iz «mardōm andar dibīr-ē»; ud agar «mardōm nē andar harv syāh», ēg-iz «syāh nē andar harv mardōm».

cē agar «b andar harv c», ēg-iz «c andar ēcand b». ud «a andar harv c», ud «c andar ēcand b», ā «a andar ēcand b». ud vizārd baved ēd zanag ī ast naxvist andar brahmag ī sidīgar, ō zanag ī siyum andar brahmag ī fradum.

cē agar «b andar harv c», ēg-iz «c andar ēcand b». nūn agar «a nē andar ēc c», ud «c andar ēcand b», ā «a nē andar harv b». ud vizārded ēn zanag ī ast duvum andar brahmag ī sidīgar, ō zanag ī cahārum andar brahmag ī fradum.

cē agar «b andar ēcand c», ēg-iz «c andar ēcand b». bē «a andar harv c», ud «c andar ēcand b», ā «a andar ēcand b». ud vizārd ēsted ēd zanag ī ast siyum andar sidīgar brahmag, ō zanag ī siyum andar brahmag ī naxvist.

cē agar «b andar ēcand c», ēg-iz «c andar ēcand b», ā «a nē andar harv b». ud vizārd ēsted ēn zanag ī ast tasum andar brahmag ī sidīgar, ō zanag ī tasum andar brahmag ī fradum.

cē agar «a nē andar ēc b», ēg-iz «b nē andar ēc c». ud «a andar ēcand c». ēg «b nē andar harv c». bē nīsād ēsted kū «b andar harv c». ud vizārd ēsted ēd zanag ī ast panzum andar brahmag ī sidīgar, ō zanag ī tasum andar brahmag ī fradum, ped rāh ī atuvānīgīh.

cē agar «a andar harv b», ud «b andar harv c», ēg «a andar harv c». bē nīsād ēsted kū «a nē andar harv c». ud vizārd ēsted ēn zanag ī ast šašum andar brahmag ī sidīgar, ō zanag ī naxvist andar brahmag ī fradum, ped rāh ī atuvānīgīh.

ped ēn šōn, hāmōyēn zanagīhā ī hangōšīdag ī andar brahmag ī didīgar ud sidīgar vizārīhend ō brahmag ī fradum, ōn kū az bun hamāg aziš spurrīgīhend.

frazaft.

<V. Prior Analytics>

§ Now, since [the number of the pairs of] opposites, universal and particular, as well unquantified and individual, is just eight, and [the number of] their propositions sixteen, we should know that: each proposition, besides signifying “all” or “part”, has two parts: one is called a subject, and the other a predicate. For whoever says that “Man is alive”, he posits “man”, and “alive” is predicated (stated) about it; and whoever says that “Man is not alive”, he also puts “man”, while “not alive” is predicated about it.

§ Now, the propositions, universal and particular, in the affirmative, both convert into particular [affirmatives], for example, if “Every man is an animal”, then also “Some animal is a man”. And universal negatives convert universally [to universal negatives], for example, “No man is a horse”, so also then “No horse is a man”. A particular negative also converts into a particular, for if “Some man is not a horse”, then also “Some horse is not a man”. The negative [propositions] which are unquantified and individual obey the same [conversion-]rule as particulars.

§ Now, one [proposition] is that which ascends, and the other that which descends. In fact, that which ascends is always true, but that which descends is often false. An ascent such as “Every man is an animal” is true, while a descent such as “Every animal is a man” is false.

§ And yet, [the definition of] conversion is as follows: When the subject [of a proposition] is predicated (becomes predicate), and the predicate is posited (becomes subject), for example, “Man is a living” – and – “Living is a man”.

§ Now, [in a simple proposition] is called a term that which is made the subject [of the proposition] (subject term) and also that which is predicated of it (predicate term). And when two simple propositions are joined to each other, they are bound by one term.

Indeed here –in these two propositions –, in the first – “Every man is an animal” – “man” is made subject and “animal” is predicated of it; and in the second – “Every animal is animate” – “animal” is made subject and “animate” is predicated of it. The proposition “Every man is an animal” and the [proposition] “Every animal is animate” both are bound by [the term] “animal”, [the term] which is a predicate in the first proposition and a subject in the second.

Sometimes also, the term by which propositions are bound is a predicate in both propositions, for example:

“Every man is an animal.”

“Every horse is an animal.”

Here, in both propositions, in that of “Every man is an animal” and also in that of “Every horse is an animal” [the terms] “man” and “horse” are bound to each other [by the term “animal].

Here, in the proposition “Every scribe is a man”, [the term] “scribe” is made subject, and “man” is predicated of it; and in the proposition “Every scribe is rational” also it is made subject, and “rational” is predicated of it. These two propositions …

§ … [the reasoning …] and in universality the conclusion, false which is called paralogism, are used in it.

§ Now, [the number of] the figures of the syllogisms is three, one is called first, another second, and another third.

§ [In] the figures and moods of syllogisms, those which are valid and which are not:

§ In the first figure:

§ The second figure:

§ Yet the third figure:

§ Now, from what has been said above, it may be known that all the premisses which are called προτάσεις should ever be posited as asserted [propositions], and from these justly asserted [propositions], we take a [logical] conclusion. In this manner appears the knowledge of that which we request.

§ In these three figures, whenever both premisses are negative, and also they two are particular, then the conclusion would never be necessary.

In the first figure, the pair [of premisses] in which the major is affirmative universal, while the minor is negative universal, and in the second figure, the pair in which the major is negative particular, <and in the third figure, the pair in which the minor is negative,> their conclusion could never be necessary.

In all [three] figures, if the pair of two premisses be negative, the conclusion is never necessary. And if [one] of the pair [of premisses] be negative, an affirmative [statement] is never concluded.

In the second figure is there no affirmative [conclusion], and in the third figure no universal necessary [conclusion] in a [valid] mood.

In fact, when the universal [statements] are true, the particulars are likewise true; but not if the particulars be true, the universals are also true.

Then the syllogisms, through which truth and falsity are known, are fourteen in number: in the first figure four, in the second figure four, and in the third figure six; besides these, there is no [other valid mood].

§ That figure is perfect in which the affirmative universal conclusion is found, also the negative universal, and yet the affirmative particular, and at the same time the negative particular. And we find all these [forms] altogether in the first figure. Then this figure is truly called first and perfect.

But the second figure in which there is not any affirmative conclusion, universal or particular, and the third figure in which there is not any universal conclusion, affirmative or negative, are called imperfect.

§ Now, those [syllogisms] which are not perfect, out of perfect ones necessarily can be perfected; so then the second figure and also the third one need the first one in order to yield perfect [syllogisms]. They can be perfected in two manners (that is, by means of two “rules”): One, by [the rules of] conversion of premisses; and the other, by means of per impossibile (reductio ad absurdum). For example, as said above, the negative universal is universally converted, for if no man be a horse, then no horse is a man.

It is resolved in this way: If “A is in no C”, then “C is in no A”. [It is proposed that] “A is in every B”. Then also “C is in no B”. And yet “B is in no C”. This mood, which is the first [valid syllogism] in the second figure, is translated (“transformed”) to the second mood in the first figure by means of two conversions.

For if “A is in no B”, then “B is in no A”. And [it is proposed that] “A is in every C”. Then “B is in no C”. And this mood, which is the second [valid syllogism] in the second figure, is “translated” to the second mood in the first figure.

For if “A is in no B”, then “B is in no A”. And [it is proposed that] “A is in some C”. [Then B is not in every C]. And this mood, which is the third in the second figure, is translated to the fourth mood in the first figure.

This mood is perfected by means of per impossibile. Since, for example, if “B is not in every C” be not true, then “B is in every C” is true. And [it is proposed that] “A is in every B”. Then “A is in every C”. However, this is not true, for it is proposed that “A is not in every C”. Then it is not true that “B is in every C”, but [its contradictory statement] is true. And this mood also, which is the fourth in the second figure, is translated to the first mood in the first figure by means of per impossibile.

§ As we said above, the affirmative propositions, universal or particular, and also privative (“negative”) [propositions which are] particular, all convert into particular [propositions]. For if “Man is in every scribe”, then “Scribe is in some man”; and if “Scribe is in some man”, then “Man is in some scribe”; and if “Man is not in every black”, then “Black is not in every man”.

For if “B is in every C”, then “C is in some B”. And [it is proposed that] “A is in every C”. And [as] “C is in some B”, then “A is in some B”. This mood, which is the first in the third figure, is translated to the third mood in the first figure.

For if “B is in every C”, then “C is in some B”. But if “A is in no C” and “C is in some B”, then “A is not in every B”. And this mood, which is the second in the third figure, is translated to the fourth mood of the first figure.

For if “B is in some C”, then “C is in some B”. And [if] “A is in every C” and “C is in some B”, then “A is in some B”. This mood, which is the third in the third figure, is translated to the third mood of the first figure.

For if “B is in some C”, [then] “C is in some B”. [But it is proposed that “A is in no C”.] Therefore, “A is not in every B”. And this mood, which is the fourth in the third figure, is translated to the fourth mood of the first figure.

For if “A is in no B”, then “B is in no A”. And [it is proposed that] “A is in some C”. Therefore, “B is not in every C”. But it is supposed that “B is in every C”. Thus this mood, which is the fifth in the third figure, is translated to the fourth one in the first figure by means of per impossibile.

For if “A is in every B” and “B is in every C”, then “A is in every C”. But it is supposed that “A is not in every C”. Thus this mood, which is the sixth one in the third figure, is translated to the first mood of the first figure by means of per impossibile.

In this manner, all the [valid] moods of the [categorical] syllogisms which are in the second and third figures are translated to the first figure, so that all of them are perfected from the beginning out of it.

Completed [the copy of] the treatise about every Ars Logica of Aristotle which composed Paul the Persian, from the town of Rēšār, for the king Husrō.